“Academics for Peace“ and their Freedom of Expression by Çalı, Başak
Başak Çalı Mi 13 Jun 2018 Mi 13 Jun 2018
“Academics for Peace“ and their Freedom of Expression
verfassungsblog.de/academics-for-peace-and-their-freedom-of-expression/
On 5 May 2018 Academics for Peace Germany issued a call for solidarity asking
academics around the world to analyse and discuss criminal prosecutions against their
colleagues by Turkish lower courts for signing what is familiarly now known as the
‘Academics for Peace Petition.’ The petition, published in January 2016, was signed by
around two thousand academics from both Turkey and from abroad. The petition raised
concerns, using strong language, about the conduct of Turkish security forces in their
counter-terrorism operations carried out in response to violent actions by the PKK terrorist
group and their supporters  in south-east Turkey in the summer of 2015. One signatory, 
Füsun Üstel, professor of political science, was found guilty of committing the crime of
terrorist propaganda under Article 7(2) of the Turkish Counter Terrorism Law and now
faces fifteen months of imprisonment. Her case is now pending before the Court of Appeal.
If the appeal court agrees with the assessment of facts and law by the lower court, she will
serve a prison sentence.
I am not one of those who signed the petition. Having witnessed the systematic disciplinary
proceedings and the criminal prosecutions of my colleagues, I have, however, signed a
second petition along with over 600 other academics that calls for respect for the
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constitutional protection of the freedom of expression of the original petition signatories.
In this blog post, I review the reasoning of the 32rd Heavy Penalty Court that meted out the
15 month custodial sentence upon Professor Dr. Füsun Üstel, on 4 April 2018. In so doing,
I show that the constitutional protection of Üstel’s freedom of expression has not been
respected by the Court in its judicial reasoning.
I provide two grounds for this from my close reading of the judgment. First, the Heavy
Penalty Court failed to recognise the lexical priority of freedom of expression as a
constitutional fundamental right as a matter of form. Second, the Court does not provide
sufficient reasons for why Üstel’s imprisonment is necessary in a democratic society as a
response to protecting national security.  The judgment, if not overturned by the Appeal
Court, will widen the gap between constitutional and international protections of freedom
expression and the anti-rights reasoning structures emerging across the country’s lower
criminal courts. The appeal court needs to correct this and bring the behaviour of the lower
courts within the realm of judicial reasoning based on the protection of fundamental rights.
Form: No constitutional lexical priority of freedom of
expression
Political expression as a constitutional and human right is a core pillar of the Turkish
constitutional legal order. It is based on the premise that protection of political expression
has a formal lexical priority to reasons for limiting it, provided by domestic law. The case
law of the Turkish Constitutional Court, echoing international human rights law and
comparative constitutional rights jurisprudence, has been very clear that any limitation on
freedom of expression must meet the requirement of exceptionality and must be justified as
a measure of last resort (Emin Aydin). This case law further states that limitations of
freedom of expression must meet the necessity in a democratic society test  (Emin Aydın,
para 48).
The Füsun Üstel judgment of the 32rd Heavy Penalty Court neither mentions nor engages
with the protection of freedom of expression under of the Constitution. Indeed, not on one
of its 20 pages does the judgment engage with the case law of the Constitutional Court.
The judgment shows no awareness of the lexical priority that the Turkish constitutional
legal order accords to freedom of expression. In one sentence, and in passing only, it
states that the suppression of expression is necessary in a democratic society, without
explaining why in concrete terms.
In contrast to its lack of interest in its own Constitutional Court, the judgment contains a
handful of vague references to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that this
Court would agree with the outcome reached in this case. There is, however, no mention of
a single case or a single jurisprudential test to support this claim. The judgment, too, has
vague references to the United States Supreme Court (a court well known for its freedom of
expression safeguards), although not a single case is cited or discussed. There are further
references to the detention of ETA supporters in Spain and the United Kingdom’s approach
to counter-terrorism. None of these, however, are substantiated and it is unclear how they
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relate to the signing of a petition by an academic. The judgment asserts that the US and the
EU would not allow propaganda from the so-called Islamic State, and that not even ‘less
developed’ countries would tolerate being accused of carrying out a massacre.
Instead of working with standards of legal reasoning intrinsic to the Turkish legal order, and
the European Court of Human Rights, of which Turkey is part, the Court offers us an
unsubstantiated list of examples to assert that the signature of the Professor is terrorist
propaganda and this is unacceptable anywhere in the world.
Substance: No test of necessity to restrict freedom of
expression
It is well known that, in order to assess whether an intervention in political expression
through criminalisation is constitutional in a legal order, the necessity of that intervention
must be shown in concrete terms. In the parlance of the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC)
and the European Court of Human Rights, this requirement is known as the test of
“necessity in a democratic society”.  The TCC holds that the nature of the statement, its
form, content, reach, timing, the person making the statement must be taken into  account
to show whether an intervention is necessary (Emin Aydın, par. 48). The case law of the
TCC further requires that the very concrete reasons by first instance courts must justify the
limitation with respect to a specifically identified legitimate aim (Erdem Gül ve Can Dündar,
par. 98). In the case of Professor Üstel, who was indicted for terrorist propaganda, we may
assume that the legitimate aim would be the protection of national security. This in turn
means that the reasoning for why Professor Üstel’s signature to this petition poses a
concrete risk to national security must be judicially explained.
The judgment of the 32nd Heavy Penalty Court bases its argumentation of necessity on
three  pillars: the content of the petition, the timing of the petition and the subsequent
actions taken by academic communities in Turkey and abroad following the prosecutions of
academics.
As to content, the Court takes the view that the petition directly criticises the Turkish
military, police and even the judiciary in strong and unacceptable language. The Court
contrasts this with the lack of any criticism of the PKK (an organisation with a long history of
terrorist acts and which initiated or took an important part in the violent events in the
summer of 2015) in the same text. The Court, therefore, takes the view that the lack of
criticism of the PKK and the strong criticism of the Turkish state offers strong evidence in
and of itself that the text was drafted, and, in turn, supported to create propaganda for a
terrorist group. The further Court takes the view that the petition inaccurately describes the
events of the summer of 2015 and that the text uses the language of PKK in its statement
of facts, thus directing its criticism to the Turkish security forces and not against the PKK. In
support of this, the Court offers a general account of events to show that it was the PKK
that spearheaded the violence and the state forces’ sole goal was to stop the violence. The
Court lastly finds additional evidence of terrorist propaganda when the petition calls for
international observers to carry out fact-finding missions, indicating, in cryptic language,
that ‘we all know what this means’.
In terms of the timing of the petition’s publication, the Court finds that this is additional
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evidence  making the petition part of a counter-propaganda effort of the PKK to legitimise
the group’s actions nationally and internationally. The Court further notes to other, related
events (seminars, conferences, international publications by academics and the
cancellation of academic events in Turkey in response to the prosecutions of the 
signatories) as evidence of continued, further PKK propaganda. All academics supporting
the rights of  free expression for the petition signatories are, therefore, part of a larger
propaganda machine.
Two important concerns of substantive legal reasoning are at stake in these discussions of
the Court.
First, the Court implicitly requires that political expression is protected when it is measured
and balanced. According to the Court, when raising concerns about the conduct of state
actors, one must also raise concerns about the conduct of terrorist organisations. The
Court further holds that those who hold academic titles have a duty to express themselves
within the boundaries of the law. Both of these starting points have no judicial basis. The
role of courts is not to tell us what expression is balanced and measured, but whether
political statements that are not, can be legitimately restricted in a democratic society. The
yardstick for this is not what domestic law says on criminalising expression, but what the
Constitution says on restricting expression.
Second, the judgment is missing one central essential piece of substantive reasoning. 
Domestic courts are under a duty to give reasons as to why the signing of a petition by an
academic (regardless of the judges’ obvious strong disagreement with its content and
timing) justifies a criminal intervention based on real and immediate risks that the petition
poses to national security.  How has Professor Üstel’s signature undermined Turkish
national security?  What clear and present danger was posed by her signature?  The
judgment makes no attempt to answer this essential question, but merely holds that the
qualification of a text as terrorist propaganda is sufficient to justify the necessity of the
intervention in the rights of the petitioner.
Conclusion
The individual criminal prosecution of Professor Üstel based on the qualification of the
petition she signed as terrorist propaganda worsens the judicial protection of the
constitutional right to freedom of expression in Turkey. The judgment of the 32nd Heavy
Penalty Court neither formally nor substantively respects the constitutional rights protection
afforded to political speech in Turkey. Instead, the judgment proposes an alternative and
anti-rights judicial reasoning structure by arguing that the petitioners are hiding behind
freedom of expression to disguise their terrorist propaganda. Yet, under the Turkish
Constitution and under all the international human rights regimes to which Turkey is party,
freedom of expression is protected as a sword, not as a shield. A judge’s duty lies in
assessing whether this sword has concretely harmed public interests.
To hold that a petition signed by 2,000 academics on a matter that is of public interest
harms the national security of the great country that Turkey is, does not stand up to judicial
scrutiny. Those who have disagreed with the petition have said this loudly and clearly on
countless occasions. Turning the voice of the politically most powerful in a society into a
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custodial sentence undermines the boundaries between politics and judicial reasoning.The
appeal court must correct this anti-constitutional rights trajectory of Turkish lower courts.
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